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Abstract
Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time
constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide
and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online
auctions – lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food,
we find that agents adopt Le ´vy flight search strategies in their exploration of ‘‘bid space’’. The Le ´vy regime, which is
characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude.
We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding
strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are
many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.
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Introduction
Animals searching for scarce food resources display movement
patterns that can be statistically classified as Le ´vy flights [1–8].
Le ´vy flights [9] represent the best strategy that can be adopted by
a searcher looking for a scarce resource in an unknown
environment [10], and foraging animals seem therefore to have
learned the best strategy for survival. Le ´vy flights describe also the
movement patterns of humans in real space [11] and the
variability of economic indices [12], but these observations do
not correspond to search processes as in the case of foraging
animals. Surprisingly, there is no indication of whether humans
also use Le ´vy flight strategies when searching for scarce resources.
Analyzing apparently unrelated data regarding online auctions, we
address here this question and show that, when searching for
scarce resources, humans explore the relevant space in the same
class of strategies as foraging animals do.
Lowest unique bid auctions are a new generation of online
markets [13–18]. Agents winning lowest unique bid auctions may
purchase expensive goods for absurdly low prices; cars, boats and
even houses can be bought for only hundreds of dollars. The idea
of the auction is strikingly simple. A good, typically with a market
value V of at least a thousand dollars, is put up for auction. The
auction duration is fixed a priori. A bid can be any amount from
one cent to a pre-determined maximum value M, generally lower
than one hundred dollars. Each time an agent makes a bid on a
value 1ƒbƒM, she pays a fee c, which ranges from one to ten
dollars depending on the auction. During the bidding period, an
agent knows only the status of her new bid, that is, whether it is
winning or not. None of the agents knows on what values the other
agents have bid until the end of the auction. When the bidding
period expires, the agent who made the lowest unmatched bid can
purchase the good for the value of the winning bid (see Fig. 1 for
an illustration of the determination of the winning bid).
Lowest unique bid auction markets are competitive arenas.
Each agent performs a search for a single target whose position
changes from auction to auction, as it is determined by the bid
history of the whole population of agents. Since the cost of each
bid is as much as 100 times larger than the natural unit of the bid,
the number of bids that can be made by a single agent is limited
and allows only a partial exploration of the bid space. Successful
agents need to identify good strategies in order to maximize their
winning chances and thus limit their risk.
Lowest unique bid auctions are just a particular variant of
online pay-to-bid auctions, but other types of pay-to-bid auctions
are regularly hosted on the web. For example, in highest unique
bid auction the mechanism of lowest unique bid auction is
inverted, and the winning bid is determined by the highest value
closest to a pre-determined upper bound value. Since these
auctions still involve a blind search of the winning value, highest
unique bid auctions are equivalent to lowest unique bid auctions.
Indeed, in this paper we analyze data taken from both types of
auctions.
Other online pay-to-bid auctions, however, can be very different
from lowest unique bid auctions. For example, the so-called penny
auctions, which have acquired a great popularity in recent years,
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bid auctions, the cost of the fee is at least 100 times larger of the
bid increment, and as a consequence, the final value of the
winning bid is much lower than the real value of the good up for
auction. However, in penny auctions the value of the winning bid
is publicly known and can only grow during the auction (i.e., the
word ‘‘penny’’ is used because, in penny auctions, bid increments
are equal to one cent). While escalation plays a very important role
in penny auctions, in this type of auctions agents do not need to
explore the bid space because the value of the winning bid is
known. Penny auctions have been the focus of some theoretical
and empirical studies [19–23].
Results
We collected data from three distinct web sites hosting lowest
unique bid auctions. We automatically downloaded and parsed the
content of the tables reporting the bid history of closed auctions.
These data sets contain all the information on individual auctions,
including the details of each bid: its value, when it was made and
who placed it. These data allow us to keep track of all the
movements performed on bid space by a given agent bidding in a
specific auction.
We show in Figure 2A a typical exploration of the bid space
performed by a single agent. The exploration of the bid space is
bursty: consecutive bid values are generally close to each other, but
from time to time the agent performs ‘‘long jumps’’ in bid space.
We first compute the jump lengths (Fig. 2B) and estimate their
probability distribution function (Fig. 2C). We find a strikingly
robust power-law scaling consistent with the exploration of the bid
space using a Le ´vy flight search strategy [9]. Note that here we use
the notion of discrete Le ´vy flights. Time and space are in fact
discrete, and the exploration of the bid space is modeled as a
discrete time Markov chain [with transition probability defined in
Eq. 8]. Our discrete model converges to a standard Le ´vy flight
only in the continuum limit of space and time [24]. The power-law
Figure 1. Unique bid auctions. Illustration of the rules of a lowest
unique bid auction. At the end of the auction, the winner results to be
the agent who has bid 3
other bids are not unique apart from the one of 5 , which is not the
lowest one. In highest unique bid auctions the mechanism is reversed,
and the winner is the agent making the highest unmatched bid.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029910.g001
Figure 2. Individual activity. (A) Bid values explored by agent 1632 on auction 19 in the data set www.uniquebidhomes.com. Bids are sorted
chronologically, and the figure reports the value bt of the t-th bid. The unit of the bid amount is one hundredth of an Australian dollar. (B) Absolute
value of the difference between two consecutive bids. The exploration of the bid space is characterized by a bursty behavior, where many small
movements are occasionally followed by large jumps. (C) Cumulative distribution function of the change in bid value. The distribution is well fitted by
a power-law, with decay exponent consistent with a~1:3+0:1 (dashed line). The agent therefore explores the bid space using a Le ´vy flight strategy.
Notice that the curve bends down because of the finiteness of the bid space. (D) Probability density function of the Le ´vy-flight exponents adopted by
agents in lowest unique bid auctions (www.uniquebidhomes.com). The blue line indicates the average value SaT^1:26 of the distribution, the red
line identifies the mode ab^1:21 of the distribution, the orange lines bound the region within one standard deviation s^0:23 from the average. (E)
Probability density function of the Le ´vy-flight exponents adopted by agents in highest unique bid auctions (www.bidmadness.com.au). In this case
we find SaT^1:36, ab^1:35 and s^0:23.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029910.g002
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 , which represents the lowest unique bid. All
 scaling can be observed both at the level of single agents (whenever
the number of bids is sufficiently large for estimating the
distribution; c.f. Figs. 2C and Supporting Information S1) and
globally, by aggregating the length of the jumps made by all agents
in all auctions (Figs. 3A and Supporting Information S1). The
density distribution of the exponents calculated over single agents
is peaked around a mean value SaT^1:3 (Figs. 2D, 2E and
Supporting Information S1), the same exponent value we estimate
for the aggregated data. Significant variations around the average
value are anyway present, and reflect the heterogeneity of the
agent strategies. The density distributions of Figs. 2D and 2E are
in fact calculated by considering different agents bidding in
different auctions.
The power-law scaling and its measured exponent are very
stable. Exponent estimates do not depend on the direction of the
jumps (Figs. 3B and Supporting Information S1) or the level of
activity of the agent (Figs. 3C and Supporting Information S1).
Surprisingly, performing Le ´vy flights does not appear to be a
learned strategy. Instead it appears to be an intrinsic feature of the
mental search process: the jump lengths in the bid space follow the
same power-law at any stage of the auction (Figs. 3D and
Supporting Information S1).
Our results represent the strongest empirical evidence for the
use of Le ´vy flight strategies in the search of scarce resources
reported in literature up to now. Differently from previous studies
where ‘‘two orders of magnitude of scaling can represent a luxury’’
[6], here the power-law decay can be clearly observed even over
four orders of magnitude. It is unlikely, though, that adopting Le ´vy
flight strategies is a deliberate choice of the agents, just as it is not
likely that animals searching for food consciously follow a Le ´vy
flight strategy. Nevertheless, the data demonstrate that the changes
in bid value are statistically consistent with a power-law decaying
distribution over several orders of magnitude (see and Supporting
Information S1) [25]. Simple correlation measurements show also
that the lengths of consecutive jumps are independent of each
other (see and Supporting Information S1). We believe that the
power-law is valid over such a broad regime because the space is
not strictly physical. That is, movements of tens of thousands of
cents can be performed for the same cost of those of only one cent.
Agents thus explore the bid space in an effectively super-diffusive
fashion, and steps are made with infinite velocity.
Model
Next, we model the lowest unique bid auction process. Consider
N agents competing in a lowest unique bid auction. We model the
successive bids of these agents as Le ´vy flight searches on bid space.
Each agent moves in a bounded one-dimensional lattice with an a
priori chosen exponent value, which may be regarded as the agent’s
strategy in the auction. In our formulation, every agent performs
the same number T of bids and may return to already visited sites.
At the beginning of the auction, every agent sits at the leftmost site
on the lattice and then performs T movements by changing, at
Figure 3. Bidding strategies of agents are Le ´vy flights. (A) Probability density function of the bid change for all agents in all auctions. We
analyze data sets from three different web sites hosting auctions: www.uniquebidhomes.com (black circles), www.lowbids.com.au (red squares) and
www.bidmadness.com.au (blue diamonds). (B) Probability density function of positive (black circles) and negative (red squares) bid changes. (C)
Probability density function of the change amount for data aggregated over agents with different levels of activity (T indicates the total number of
bids made by an agent in a single auction). (D) Probability density function of the change amount at different stages of the auctions (t stands for
order of the bid change in the bid history of an agent). In (A), (B) and (D) results have been obtained for lowest unique bid auctions (www.
uniquebidhomes.com). All dashed lines stand for best power-law fits (least square) and all exponent values are consistent with a~1:4+0:1. The unit
of the bid value change amount is one hundredth of an Australian dollar.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029910.g003
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a power-law distribution. If at stage t{1 the agent with strategy a
is sitting at position j, then at stage t she jumps to position i with
probability proportional to i{j jj
{a. This model provides us with
an independent way to determine the exponent values of the Le ´vy
flights and offers a strikingly good statistical description of the data
(Fig. 2B and Supporting Information S1).
We focus our attention on a generic agent bidding with strategy
b and on her chances to win auctions in which the rest of the
population is bidding with strategy c. More complicated situations
may in principle be studied with the same formalism.
Single bid
Consider first the case in which agents make a single bid. The
probability that a generic opponent, using bidding strategy c, bids
on value i is
pc i ðÞ ~i{c=m c ðÞ , ð1Þ
with m c ðÞ ~
PM
j~1 j{c proper normalization constant. Here we
consider the simple case in which all agents adopt the same
bidding strategy c. The probability of Eq. (1) can be anyway made
more general by assuming that agents chose strategies from a
density distribution g a ðÞ and calculating the probability of Eq. 1 as
pi ðÞ ~
Ð
da i{a=m a ðÞ g a ðÞ . After all agents have bid, there will be
nk bids on the k-th bid value. Such variables clearly obey the
constraint N~
PM
k~1 nk. The probability to observe a particular
configuration n fg ~ n1,n2,...,nk,...,nM ðÞ is given by
Pc n fg ðÞ ~N! P
M
k~1
pc k ðÞ
   nk
nk!
, ð2Þ
which is a multinomial distribution with weights given by Eq. (1).
In particular, the probability that only one bid (i.e., a unique bid) is
made on value i is
uc i ðÞ ~Pc ni~1 ðÞ ~
X
P
k=i nk~N{1
Pc n fg ðÞ ~ Npc i ðÞ1{pc i ðÞ
   N{1: ð3Þ
Focus now on the agent with bidding strategy b. The probability
that, making a bid on value v, she makes a lowest unique bid can
be calculated exactly by summing the multinomial distribution of
Eq. (2) over all configurations for which there are no bids on the
value v and there is not a unique bid on a value smaller than v, and
finally multiplying this factor by the probability that the agent with
bidding strategy b bids on the value v. Such exact calculation is
however unfeasible due to the extremely high number of possible
combinations, and therefore we approximate the probability that,
making a bid on value v, the agent with bidding strategy b makes a
lowest unique bid as
lb,c v ðÞ ~pb v ðÞ1{pc v ðÞ
   N P
kvv
1{uc k ðÞ
  
: ð4Þ
The r.h.s. of Eq. (4) is the product of three terms: pb v ðÞis the
probability that the agent bids on value v; 1{pc v ðÞ
   N is the
probability that none of the opponents have bid on value v;
Pkvv 1{uc k ðÞ
  
is the probability that none of the bid values
smaller than v are occupied by a single bid made by one of the
opponents. In spite of the fact that Eq. (4) is just an approximation
of the real lb,c v ðÞ , the approximation can be considered good
because able to reproduce the results obtained from the direct
simulation of the process (see the section Results). Moreover in the
simplest case in which N~1, it correctly reduces to the exact value
lb,c v ðÞ ~pb v ðÞ Pkƒv 1{pc k ðÞ
  
.
Finally, the probability that the agent with bidding strategy b
wins the auction is
wb,c~
X M
v~1
lb,c v ðÞ ð 5Þ
and, on average, the value of her winning bid is
SvTb,c~
X M
v~1
vl b,c v ðÞ : ð6Þ
Repeated auctions
Imagine now to repeat the same auction G independent times.
The probability that the agent bidding with strategy b wins g times
out of G total auctions is given by a binomial distribution
Pb,c g ðÞ ~
G
g
  
wb,c
   g 1{wb,c
   G{g:
If the agent with bidding strategy b wins g auctions, the sum of her
winning bids is a random variable I whose probability is
determined by
Rb,c Ig j ðÞ ~
X
v1zv2z...zvg~I
lb,c v1 ðÞ lb,c v2 ð Þ   lb,c vg
  
,
where the sum runs over the integer indices v1, v2,… ,vg with the
constraint that their sum should equal I. Excluding bidding costs,
the average return of the agent in g victories is
rb,c g ðÞ ~ gV{I ðÞ =G:
In general, the probability that the sum of the winning bids is
equal to I in an arbitrary number of auctions won by the player
with bidding strategy b can be calculated as
Rb,c I ðÞ ~
X
g
Pb,c g ðÞ Rb,c Ig j ðÞ ,
and a similar expression can be derived for the distribution of
rb,c g ðÞ . However, we are interested in the case in which the
number of auctions diverges (G&1). In this limit, we can
approximate the number of victories with its average
SgT~Gwb,c as well as the sum of the winning bids as
I~SgTSvTb,c~Gwb,cSvTb,c. The return of the agent with bidding
strategy b is therefore
rb,c~wb,c V{SvTb,c
  
: ð7Þ
For rb,cwc, the agent has a positive return for participating in the
auction, whereas, for rb,cvc, her return is negative.
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Given a generic agent with bidding strategy a, her first bid is
placed on value i with probability q(1)
a i ðÞ ~i{a=m a ðÞ . For the
subsequent bids, we need to define a transition matrix Qa, whose
generic element Qa ðÞ ji gives the probability that the agent bids on
value i when her previous bid has been made on value j. In our
model, we have
Qa ðÞ ji~
i{j jj
{a 1{d i{j ðÞ ½ 
mj a ðÞ
, ð8Þ
for all i and j in the interval ½1,M . d : ðÞis the Kronecker delta,
equal to one if its argument is equal to zero, and equal to zero
otherwise. The normalization constant mj a ðÞ ~
XM
i~1,i=j i{j jj
{a
ensures the proper definition of the transition matrix. The matrix
Q describes a random walker performing uncorrelated Le ´vy flights
with exponent a. Notice that the agent has no memory of her
previous bid values and therefore she may place more than a bid
on the same value. At the generic step t, the probability that the
agent with bidding strategy a bids on the value i is
q(t)
a i ðÞ ~
X M
j~1
Qa ðÞ ji q(t{1)
a j ðÞ :
The probability that this agent has bid, during her T bids, on
value i is then
s(T)
a i ðÞ ~1{ P
T
t~1
1{q(t)
a i ðÞ
  
:
The term 1{q(t)
a i ðÞcounts the probability that the agent has not
bid on value i at stage t. The probability that the agent has not bid
on value i at any stage is therefore the product of this single step
probabilities. Finally, the probability that the agent has bid on
value i at least once is calculated as the probability to have bid on
value i an arbitrary number of times minus the probability to have
never bid on value i.
Now go back to the situation in which an agent with bidding
strategy b is opposed to a population of N agents with bidding
strategy c. The probability that the agent with bidding strategy b
has bid, in T steps, at least once on value i is s
(T)
b i ðÞ . The
probability that one of the N opponents, bidding with strategy c,
makes a unique bid on value i is given by
u
(T)
b,c i ðÞ ~Ns (T)
c i ðÞ1{s(T)
c i ðÞ
hi N{1
1{s
(T)
b i ðÞ
hi
: ð9Þ
u
(T)
b,c i ðÞis the product of two terms: Ns (T)
c i ðÞ1{s(T)
c i ðÞ
hi N{1
is the
probability that a bid on value i is unmatched by any of the other
N{1 opponents, while 1{s
(T)
b i ðÞis the probability that also the
agent, with bidding strategy b, does not bid on value i. The probability
that the agent with strategy b wins the auction with a bid on value v is
l
(T)
b,c v ðÞ ~s
(T)
b v ðÞ1{s(T)
c v ðÞ
hi N
P
kvv
1{u
(T)
b,c v ðÞ
hi
, ð10Þ
respectively standing for the product of the probabilities that: she bids
on value v; none of the other agents bids on value v;n o n eo ft h eb i d s
with value smaller than v is unique. Eqs. (9) and (10) represent the
generalization of Eqs. (3) and (4), respectively. In Eq. (10) we made the
same type of approximation as the one used for writing Eq. (4). The
probability w
(T)
b,c that the agent with bidding strategy b wins the
auction and the average value SvT
(T)
b,c of her winning bids can be
respectively calculated using Eqs. (5) and (6). Finally, excluding
bidding costs, the return rb,c of the agent with strategy b over an
infinite number of auctions is again given by Eq. (7). For rb,cwTc,t h e
agent has apositive returnforparticipating in the auction,whereas,for
rb,cvTc, her return is negative.
Model predictions
We show in Fig. 4 the results obtained with our analytical
model. The presence of a saddle point at cs~bs indicates that bs is
an optimal strategy or Nash equilibrium [26–28]. When the
opponents do not bid rationally (i.e., c=cs), it is more convenient
to use a strategy b=bs. On the other hand, when the other agents
bid rationally (i.e., c~cs), there is no better strategy than bs. The
value of bs depends on the parameters N and T, but for realistic
choices (see and Supporting Information S1 and Fig. 4), bs is in the
range 1:2 to 1:5, the same range of the exponent values we
estimated from the data. Thus, despite its simplicity, our model
captures the main features of the real auctions. Performing Le ´vy
flights with small exponents (ballistic motion) yields unique bids
that are unlikely to be the lowest. On the other hand, performing
preferentially short jumps (high exponents, diffusive motion)
guarantees to always bid on small values which are unlikely to
be unique. Intermediate values of the exponent (super-diffusive
motion) represent a compromise between staying low and being
unique, and therefore lead to maximal winning chances. These
considerations are valid only for finite values of N and T, which is
the realistic case. Because the available positions in the lattice are
finite, when either N or T grow, the probability to observe a
unique bid progressively approaches zero [29]. Notice that at the
saddle point cs~bs, all Nz1 agents are using the same bidding
strategy and therefore they all have the same chances to win the
auction. In particular, the probability that a generic agent wins the
auction is wbs,csƒ1= Nz1 ðÞ , where the inequality may arise
because a unique and lowest bid may not exist.
The value of the exponent, corresponding to the optimal Le ´vy
flight strategy in lowest unique bid auctions, is distinct from the
one found in the case of purely random searches [10], and
empirically observed in the movement patterns of foraging animals
[1–8]. The quantitative difference arises, we believe, as a
consequence of the anisotropy of the bid space (low values are
favored), the role of competition, and, more importantly, the fact
that the target is not ‘‘static’’ but moving according to the actions
of the whole population of agents.
Discussion
In lowest unique bid auctions, agents have the possibility to win
goods of high value for impossibly low prices (Figs. 5A and 5C),
However, these all-pay auction markets are designed to be very
profitable for the auctioneers [30–33], who, on average, double
their investment (Figs. 5B, 5D and Supporting Information S1).
For auctioneers, the profitability of lowest unique bid auctions is in
fact guaranteed by the validity of the inequality VvBc, where B
stands for the total number of bids and equals Nz1 ðÞ T in our
model. Under this constraint however, the payoff of a generic
agent in a perfectly rational population is always negative since
rbs,csvwbs,csVƒ
V
Nz1
vTc,
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participating as a bidder in the auction markets. The rationality of
the economic agents in adopting optimal strategies seems,
therefore, in contrast with the ultimate irrationality that induces
agents to take part in these auction markets.
Competitive irrationality, based on rational choices, has been
investigated in economic theories [34–37], such as the dollar
auction game [38]. The decision to participate or not participate
in lowest unique bid auctions presents a paradox for potential
bidders. If the number of agents participating in the auction is not
too high, then the auction would bring a positive economic return
to the agents, but not to the auctioneers. For example, in the case
in which only one bidder participates in the auction, this bidder
would have the maximal economic return by placing a single bid
on the lowest value allowed. But by this token, every agent will feel
that participating is profitable as long as not many other agents
have bid yet. However, no agent can know how many other agents
will actually bid on the good.
Our results raise a number of important research questions.
First, which brain regions are responsible for implementing the
search strategies used by agents? Since agents use similar search
strategies to bees or birds, it is likely that there is no frontal cortex
involvement. Using neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI it
should be possible to answer this question. Second, does the
economic paradox that the agents face reveal itself in brain activity
patterns? Specifically, do some of the changes in brain activity
observed for preference reversal [39,40] occur also in this case?
Additionally, our results suggest that controlled lowest unique bid
auction markets would offer the possibility to run large-scale
experiments at relatively low cost [41]. These experiments could
be used for monitoring the behavior of agents in auction markets
with tunable optimal search strategies, and see if (and how fast)
agents are able to adapt their behavior to optimality.
Materials and Methods
Data have been collected from three publicly accessible web
sites: www.uniquebidhomes.com, www.lowbids.com.au and www.
bidmadness.com.au. Also, we make available a version of these
data at the web page filrad.homelinux.org/resources.
Figure 4. Model predictions. Economic return rb,c [Eq. (7)], divided by the number of bids T, of an agent bidding with strategy b when competing,
in a lowest unique bid auction with upper-bound M~1,000 and for a good of value V~10,000, against N~100 opponents bidding with strategy c.
Unless specified, the quantity rb,c reported in this plots is computed by numerically solving the equations of the model. (A) Case where each agent
performs a single bid in the auction, for three values of c. Theoretical predictions (lines) are compared with the results of numerical simulations
(symbols). In each simulation of the auction, we randomly extracted N bid values j with probability proportional to j{c, and a single bid value v with
probability proportional to v{b. For a given set of parameters, we repeated the same simulation G~10,000 times, and calculate the number of times
g in which the bid value extracted from the power-law distribution with exponent b was the winning bid, and the sum I of these winning bid values.
The economic return has been finally calculated as rb,c~ gV{I ðÞ =G.( B) Exploration of parameter space reveals the existence of a saddle point at
bs~cs^1:27.( C) Case where each agent performs 10 bids in the auction, for three values of c. Numerical simulations have been carried out as in the
former case, but considering agents moving in the bid space according to Eq. (8). (D) Exploration of parameter space reveals the existence of a saddle
point at bs~cs^1:38.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029910.g004
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Supporting Information S1 ‘‘Lowest Unique Bid’’ and
‘‘Highest Unique Bid’’ Auctions.
(PDF)
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